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Abstract 
Recent thinking and practice in transitional justice suggest that victims and societies hold indivisible, 
perhaps even simultaneous, rights to truth, justice and reparations after gross human rights 
violations. This paper analyses the advantages and drawbacks of such holistic approaches to 
transitional justice, through a case study of Chile’s second official truth commission, the ‘Valech 
Commission’. The paper illustrates the politics of ongoing contestation about authoritarian era 
crimes in Latin America, showing how and why the commission was designed to deliver on certain 
truth and reparations obligations toward survivors of past state repression, while attempting to 
explicitly decouple truth revelations from judicial consequences. It also discusses the implications 
of associating truthtelling and reparations in a single instance, and in doing so contributes to debate 
about the potentially contradictory or counterproductive outcomes that may arise from the yoking 
together of truth, justice and reparations functions in transitional justice policy design. 
 
Introduction 
Since at least the 1980s, and based in large part on experiences from Latin America, thinking and 
practice about how to manage the legacy of past authoritarian violence and/or massive human 
rights violations has taken place under the rubric of ‘transitional justice.’1  Early models of 
                                                          
1 Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice Genealogy’, Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003), pp. 69-94. 
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transitional justice (TJ) practice tended to address truth, justice and reparations questions 
separately, or even sequentially, crafting dedicated, time-limited instances including truth 
commissions, prosecutions and/or amnesty laws, and reparations packages for the most directly 
affected victims.  Modern transitional justice thinking seems to be moving away from this modular, 
‘mix and match’ approach, due in part to the migration of the transitional justice paradigm to post-
conflict settings, and also to growing appreciation of the broad and lasting legacies, including 
intergenerational legacies, of political violence. Recent studies have investigated the broader and 
longer societal impact of sui generis inventions such as the truth commission,2 and/or the effects of 
timing and sequencing on anticipated and unanticipated outcomes of TJ policies.3 Other theorists 
have suggested that gender justice, development agendas, and other questions of structural 
fairness should become part of the transitional justice canon.4 At a minimum, international 
organisations increasingly adopt rights-based and victim-centred framings which speak of 
simultaneous and complementary right(s) to truth, justice, reparations and (sometimes) guarantees 
of non-repetition in the aftermath of serious political violence. They derive corresponding matrices 
of duties incumbent on states, and criticise as deficient measures that address only a single TJ 
problem or need.5  
                                                          
2 Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies (New York: Routledge, 2010); Onur 
Bakiner, ‘Truth Commission Impact: An Assessment of How Commissions Influence Politics and Society ‘, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, 8:1 (2014), pp. 6-30. For a study of Chile’s first truth 
commission, see Anita Ferrara, Assessing the Long Term Impact of Truth Commissions (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2014). 
3 See for example Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance (Washington: 
USIP, 2011.) 
4 Inter alia, Paul Gready and Simon Robins, ‘From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for 
Practice ‘International Journal of Transitional Justice 8:3 (2014), pp. 339-61; Dustin N. Sharp ‘Emancipating 
Transitional Justice from the Bonds of the Paradigmatic Transition’, International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 9:1 (2015), pp. 150-69; Lars Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic 
Wrongs’. Social & Legal Studies, 21:2 (2012), pp. 171-86; Pablo de Greiff and R Duthie, eds., Transitional 
Justice and Development: Making Connections (New York: SSRC, 2009) 
5 See, inter alia, United Nations (UN) Updated Set of Principles to Combat Impunity (UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1); UN Basic Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (UN GA Resolution 
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For Latin America, clustering of truth, justice and reparations, particularly, into an 
apparently consubstantial whole, and the use of ‘rights talk’ about them, is increasingly apparent in 
recent public policy discourse, and, sometimes, judicial practice, in and about Colombia,6 Argentina,7 
and Brazil,8 for example. The incipient trend towards ‘bundling’ TJ-related measures into an 
indivisible set can perhaps be most clearly seen in the activities of the two-tier Inter-American 
human rights system, uniquely activist on TJ matters at least since the founding of the Court 
founding in 1979, at the height of dictatorship-era violence.9 Both Commission and Court regularly 
produce recommendations or verdicts making explicit reference to multiple TJ dimensions.10 A 
recent Commission report on the right to truth for example, meticulously explores justice, 
reparation and reform measures as directly pertinent, if not integral, to delivery of full truth.11  Time 
has also shown the dimensions of TJ to be are in practice inextricable, since a single measure often 
                                                          
60/147), and reports by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparations and 
Guarantees of Non-recurrence to the UN General Assembly (UN Doc. A/69/518, 14 Oct. 2014); and to the 
UN Human Rights Council (UN Doc. A/HRC/27/56, 27 Aug. 2014 and UN Doc. A/HRC/21/46, 9 Aug. 2012). 
6 Viz. the Victims and Land Restitution Law of 2011, and ongoing peace negotiations which have, unusually, 
explicitly foregrounded transitional justice concerns and the language of victims’ rights, most recently in. 
interim justice and reparations agreements signed in mid-December 2015. 
7 Argentina pioneered an explicitly rights based approach within particular dimensions (viz. the ‘right to 
truth’, Lapacó case, Inter-American Commission, 2000). The interconnection between dimensions has also 
been used to leverage advances at times of apparent stasis, as when the 1990s ‘truth trials’ used judicial 
processes to produce factual revelation even when amnesty still precluded punishment. It remains to be 
seen how the 2016 change in government may however affect a transitional justice policy process that had 
become increasingly politically partisan under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015). 
8 The powerful symbolic and reparatory effects of the Brazilian Amnesty Commission’s ‘Memory Caravan’ 
hearings, acknowledging former political prisoners, have helped fuel wider truth and justice demands, 
paving the way for a fully-fledged official truth commission which reported in December 2014.  Individuals 
associated with the Amnesty Commission have also promoted an active country-wide university TJ network 
and supported efforts by a handful of state prosecutors to open criminal cases for torture. See 
www.rlajt.com ; or  http://transitionaljusticeinbrazil.com/ 
9 Alejandra Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce 
Human Rights’, Cornell International Law Journal, 493 (2011) pp101-155. 
10 The Court typically insists on a strong duty to prosecute and punish, requiring ‘due expedition’ of judicial 
proceedings together with state acknowledgment (truthtelling) and economic or symbolic reparations. See 
inter alia Inter-American Court cases La Cantuta v. Peru (2006); Almonacid (2006) and García Lucero (2013) 
v. Chile; Gomes Lund v Brazil (2010); Gelman v. Uruguay (2013), and El Mozote v. El Salvador (2012).   
11 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), 2014, ‘The Right to Truth in the Americas’ 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.152 Doc.2 
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has an impact across more than one dimension.  Thus, memorialisation can have preventive and 
reparatory aspects, civil cases are one route to economic reparation, and criminal proceedings may 
reveal truth as well as providing justice.12 
A 2013 London conference discussing rights-based transitional justice experiences in Latin America 
suggested that in the past, these dimensions were often demanded and delivered in disaggregated 
ways.13  Thus groups might campaign for - and transitional states deliver (or not) – initiatives such 
as truth commissions to resolve the question ‘¿Dónde Están?’ (‘where are they?’), regarding the 
disappeared.  At another moment, an anti-impunity campaign might seek to challenge the status of 
amnesty.  Reparations might be addressed separately, if at all. It is arguably more common today 
than it was previously to find organisations and campaigns with multiple, rather than single-issue, 
agendas.14  Is this more holistic agenda, where truth, justice, reparations and/or forward-looking 
reforms can be seen or claimed as a bundle of related entitlements, also visible in official TJ practice 
or policy?  Do authorities, for example, today create multi-purpose TJ agencies, rather than 
standalone truth, justice or reparations instances? Do new measures, such as the Brazilian truth 
commission, appear intended to deliver simultaneously across more than one dimension? Are states 
with relatively long transitional justice histories showing signs of actively seeking to increase connect 
                                                          
12 A fact often overlooked in debates over the relative merits of truth or justice.  As Wilde remarks, for Chile, 
“[h]istorical truth was uncovered above all through the pursuit of justice.” Alexander Wilde, ‘A Season of 
Memory’, in Cath Collins, Katherine Hite and Alfredo Joignant, eds, The Politics of Memory in Chile (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2013), p. 39. See also  Daniela Accatino and Cath Collins ‘Truth, Evidence, Truth: The 
Deployment of Testimony, Archives and Technical Data in Domestic Human Rights Trials’, Journal of Human 
Rights Practice, forthcoming, 2016.    
13 Conference ‘The right to truth, justice and reparations in Latin America’, Institute for the Study of the 
Americas, University of London, 4 June 2013. 
14 At least for Chile, the setting with which this author is most familiar. Expansive group agendas, particularly 
notable since 1998, now commonly include ‘verdad, justicia y reparación integral (truth, justice, and holistic 
reparations)’ or verdad, justicia y memoria (‘truth, justice and memory’).  Some groups have explicitly 
chosen to link historic demands to contemporary rights claims in a desire to strengthen both: see for 
example an access to truth campaign pursued by a network of Chilean memory site groups 
www.londres38.cl   
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and overlap between dimensions in existing instances, or to iron out previous interference or 
negative synergy through policy innovation? 
 
Case study: The interconnectedness of truth with other transitional justice dimensions in present-
day Chile 
This paper explores these questions through a case study of recent measures in one setting.  Chile, 
a classic example of Latin American authoritarian-to-democratic transition, has a long and rich 
transitional justice history including at least some measures in each of the four abovementioned 
dimensions. It has also seen significant planned and unplanned TJ innovations, and shifts and 
sometimes reversals in each of them, since its 1990 return to electoral democracy. These 
innovations include an early (1991) official truth commission plus a second such instance, over a 
decade later. Chile therefore offers a unique opportunity to study an empirically rich, long-running 
(25 year) transitional justice trajectory that includes two truth commissions and significant recent 
contestation around new TJ practice.15  
Recent developments in Chile’s management of dictatorship-era legacies are undeniably significant. 
They include, as well as the second truth commission, interpretive narrowing of blanket amnesty 
(leading to perpetrator prosecutions); ratification of new international human rights instruments; 
and the inauguration of a Memory Museum, National Human Rights Institute, and Human Rights 
Secretariat. Often proudly cited by the Chilean state as evidence of its continued prioritisation of 
                                                          
15 All Chile’s TJ policy innovations and modifications have been surrounded by, indeed driven by, competing 
right, left, and military tensions as much as by enlightened elite policymaking. See below and Cath Collins 
‘Human Rights Policy under the Concertación’, in Peter Siavelis and Kirsten Sehnbruch (eds.) Democratic 
Chile: The Politics and Policies of a Historic Coalition, 1990–2010 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2014), pp. 143-72; 
or Cath Collins, ‘Chile a más de dos décadas de justicia de transición’, Política, 51:2 (2013), pp. 79-113. 
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responses to dictatorship-era abuses,16 these initiatives are nonetheless quite consonant with the 
historically subdued, reactive, and generally low key attitude by Chilean authorities to transitional 
justice challenges.17 Closer examination reveals relatively little evidence of design for longevity, an 
option for ‘joined up’ TJ policy, or conscious modelling of interventions on regional or international 
standards.  Policy initiatives continue rather to be stubbornly, perhaps even increasingly, temporary 
in duration, and insulated or isolated one from another.18  
Focus and sources 
This paper discusses recent innovation along the truth dimension of Chilean TJ policy; specifically, 
the second official truth commission (‘Valech Commission’), which functioned in 2004/5, with a 
second iteration in 2011.19 The paper discusses both the sufficiency of the Valech endeavour as a 
truth measure, and its interrelationship, or not, with justice and reparations.  After showing that 
Chile’s most recent truth measure attempted to isolate truth advances from justice, while linking 
them strongly and explicitly to reparations, I go on to discuss the practical and conceptual-
theoretical problems illustrated by and associated with each of these characteristics. 
                                                          
16 See for example official submissions to the Inter-American Court in the Almonacid and García Lucero cases 
(2006 and 2013), Universal Periodic Review submissions to the UN Human Rights Council (2009 and 2014), 
and authorities’ responses to the 2012 report of the UN Working Group on Forced and Involuntary 
Disappearances’ mission to Chile (on file with author).  
17 Anne Pérotin refers to the “extreme discretion” with which the political class proceeded on this issue in 
the 1990s, and José Zalaquett to a “reactive attitude” in the same period. Anne Pérotin-Dumon, ‘El pasado 
vivo de Chile en el año del Informe sobre la Tortura’, Nuevo Mundo, Mundos Nuevos 5 (2005); and José 
Zalaquett, ‘No Hay Mañana Sin Ayer: Análisis de la Propuesta del Presidente Ricardo Lagos sobre Derechos 
Humanos’, Estudios Públicos 92 (Spring 2003), pp. 29- 62. 
18 See the National Human Rights Institute, INDH, Informe Anual 2013, available from www.indh.cl and the 
INDH’s associated 2013 memorandum on the human rights subsecretariat draft bill (http://www.indh.cl/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Minuta-subsecretaria-DDHH1.pdf-ok1.pdf ). 
19 Henceforth, the term ‘Valech II’ will be employed when specific reference to the 2011 iteration is needed, 
though ‘Valech’ will also be used generically, where appropriate, to refer to both iterations. 
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Valech has to date been relatively little-studied, especially in English-language scholarship.20  
Moreover, the policy isolation described above, which it exemplifies, has recently come under 
sustained pressure from civil society and the judicial branch. (A secrecy law barring access to its 
archives was partly overturned in 2014, allowing some judicial access, while in 2015, survivors 
sought to expand its remit, improve reparations, and introduce linkages to justice). Both of these 
facts make Valech a suitable and indeed obligatory object of study for scholars interested in the 
political and sociolegal dynamics surrounding real-world truth commission operation; the pressures 
that can arise as the boundaries between truth, justice and reparations ramifications of a single 
instance, or the implications of piecemeal versus holistic approaches to TJ. Aspects of particular 
theoretical and comparative interest include the sharp contrast between an evident official desire 
to finally close a chapter in the country’s TJ history, by addressing  survivors’ needs more fully than 
before, and the actual effect of Valech in fuelling renewed criticism and activism from that same 
constituency.  
The commission dealt with political imprisonment and torture, acknowledging a total of almost 
39,000 individual survivors.21  ‘Sober and austere’ reparations had already been promised as a likely 
corollary. The prologue to the report’s initial conclusions also mentioned forward-looking rights 
protections – which could be understood as guarantees of non-repetition - and a “juridical and 
economic” dimension to individual reparations. It was, however, made clear that the ‘juridical 
dimension’ meant “restoring the dignity of [survivors],”22 rather than perpetrator prosecutions, of 
                                                          
20 Exceptions include Elizabeth Lira and Brian Loveman ‘Torture as Public Policy, 1810-2011’, in Collins, Hite 
and Joignant (eds.), op. cit., pp.91-132 (volume also published in Spanish as La Politica de la Memoria en 
Chile: desde Pinochet a Bachelet, Santiago: UDP, 2014) and, in Spanish: Pérotin-Dumon, op.cit., and 
Zalaquett, op.cit.   
21 For perspectives on the commission’s origins see below, Wilde (op. cit.), and Elizabeth Lira and Brian 
Loveman, 2014, op. cit.. Lira was a member of both iterations of the commission. 
22 Taking the form of, for example, wiping criminal records for those whose only offence had been political 
opposition to the regime. 
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which no mention was made. There was, however, reference to the “privacy” of commission 
proceedings.23 In the event, existing ‘Rettig reparations’ – provisions for victims’ relatives - were 
updated, then extended in a modified form to survivors named in the Valech lists.24  Meanwhile, 
immediate justice implications were not only de-emphasised but were rendered impossible, by 
means of a 50-year secrecy law forbidding public and judicial access to any Valech deliberations, 
testimony, or background documents.25 This tension between truth and justice was particularly 
acute, and became the faultline around which future controversy coalesced. 
For sources, this paper draws heavily on original material produced by the Human Rights 
Observatory26 of Chile’s Universidad Diego Portales (UDP), from close on-the-ground observation 
since 2008 of key events in Chilean TJ. This material includes records of seminars convened by the 
Observatory, news summaries published as regular electronic bulletins, and seven iterations of an 
annual national human rights report published by the UDP. In the interests of space and readability, 
these documents are not always individually referenced in full in each section of the paper. All are 
freely accessible from the Observatorio Justicia Transicional section of the website 
www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl. The paper also draws on numerous interviews with actors in, and 
users of, the Valech Commission and subsequent measures.  Around 35 interviews were carried out 
between 2004 and 2015, clustered in 2004-05, 2012-13, and 2015. Observatory researcher Jennifer 
                                                          
23 Message by then-president Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006), Valech report prologue, pp 2 and 3, author’s 
translation. 
24 Valech’s initial 2004 round produced a substantial printed report accompanied by survivor lists. In 2005, 
appendices of newly recognised cases were added. The 2011 iteration produced only a victim list and 
accompanying statistics. See Observatorio DDHH: ‘Taller Comisión Valech II – Aspectos Metodológicos’ 
available via www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl  
25 Supreme Decree No 1,040, of 26 September 2003, Art 5, establishes ‘reserve for all legal effects’ (author’s 
translation), as does Law 20.405, of 10 Dec. 2009, Transitory Article 3, para 6, subsection 1. 
26 Known since 2014 as the Observatorio de Justicia Transicional. 
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Herbst carried out the 2012 interviews. The author is indebted to her and to other members of the 
Observatory team.27 All conclusions drawn remain the sole responsibility of this author. 
Structure and conceptual framework 
This paper’s starting premise is the empirical contention, made above, that an emerging regional 
and international norm set seeks to construct a moral and/or legal duty on states to essay the 
comprehensive delivery of truth, justice and reparations after past political violence.28 Such a 
framework is unambiguously normative, derived from aspirations and standards in soft law, 
guidelines, and jurisprudence rather than codified law or positive treaty obligations.29  Accordingly, 
and correctly, disputed and critiqued, the empirical existence and in-region influence of this 
framework is nonetheless undeniable. It is also useful for allowing something substantive, and 
potentially comparative, to be said about a particular country’s present transitional justice practice.  
This paper will accordingly go on to discuss the strengths, weaknesses, achievements and limitations 
of the Valech truth initiatives, and subsequent developments, with reference to this framework. The 
paper however allows for the possibility that the framework itself, rather than Chile’s specific 
practice, may thereby be found wanting. In other words, it remains agnostic regarding the validity 
                                                          
27 Since 2008, Juan Pablo Delgado, Mayra Feddersen, Karinna Fernández, María Florencia González, Boris 
Hau, Rodrigo Hernández, Jennifer Herbst, Alice Pfeiffer, Antonio Poveda, Tabata Santelices, Maria Ignacia 
Terra, Camila Varela, and Paulina Zamorano.  The project received initial funding support from the Ford 
Foundation and the Heinrich Boell Foundation. 
28 This development is both clearly visible and critically analysed in an abundant academic and practitioner 
literature, generalist and Americas-focused. See, inter alia, Susanne Buckley-Zistel et. al, eds., Transitional 
Justice Theories (Abingdon, Routledge, 2014); Par Engstrom, ‘The Inter-American Human Rights System and 
Transitional Justice in Latin America’, remarks to the conference ‘Putting the State on Trial’, Ulster 
University, Belfast, 17 October 2013; Félix Reátegui (ed.) Transitional Justice: Handbook for Latin America 
(Brasilia, NY: Brazilian Ministry of Justice/ ICTJ, 2011); SLADI, ‘Justicia Transicional en América Latina: Primer 
Informe del grupo de trabajo’, 2011; Kathyrn Sikkink, The Justice  Cascade (NY: Norton, 2011); Kai Ambos, 
Ezequiel Malarino and Gisela Elsner (eds.), Justicia de Transición (Montevideo: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
2009), Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
29 For now-extensive jurisprudence from domestic courts see Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF); Digest 
of Latin American Jurisprudence on International Crimes Vols 1 and 2 (Washington DC: DPLF 2010, 2013), 
and Digest of Latin American Jurisprudence on the Rights of Victims (Washington DC: DPLF, 2015).  
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or superiority of holistic TJ rights framings and expectations, suggesting that important questions 
about synergy, compatibility and viability remain unaddressed.  In so doing, it follows Leebaw and 
others in challenging the maximalist aspirations of certain evangelical approaches to transitional 
justice advocacy.30 
Emerging norm sets surrounding truth, justice and reparations 
Maximal, and maximally holistic, approaches to TJ tend to be associated with increasingly ambitious 
and developed sufficiency standards for each dimension.  These include for example the proposition 
that truth should be public, reliable, complete, and widely-known; while also being a step towards 
timely, proportional, and proactive justice.31 Under such a schema, states wishing to fully meet 
international obligations to prosecute and punish serious violations can probably no longer merely 
tolerate claimbringing by victims and/or third parties.32  Nor is it acceptable to impede prosecution 
or abrogate the possibility of punishment through blanket domestic amnesty and/or statutes of 
limitation, at least for war crimes and crimes against humanity. States are increasingly expected to 
demonstrate an active prosecution policy for those crimes that clearly require it. 33   Reparations are 
                                                          
30 Bronwyn Leebaw, ‘The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice’, Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2008) pp. 
95-118. See also Padraig McAuliffe, ‘Transitional Justice’s Expanding Empire’, Journal of Conflictology 2: 2, 
2011, pp. 32-44. 
31 In addition to the UN Rapporteur documents cited at supra n.5, see Cristián Correa, ‘Reparation Programs 
for Mass Violations of Human Rights’, in Reátegui, op. cit., pp. 409 ff. Correa argues strongly for coherence 
and mutual reinforcement between truth, justice and reparations measures to become a fundamental TJ 
design principle. 
32 Many Iberoamerican legal systems allow victims, NGOs or civil society associations to act as direct 
complainants in the criminal as well as civil justice system. However, full state compliance is arguably now 
being interpreted as requiring ‘de officio’, state-initiated, prosecution. See, inter alia, Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, García Lucero v Chile, Sentence of 28 Aug. 2013, and UN Special Rapporteur Report to the 
UN Human Rights Council on Prosecutorial Prioritization Strategies in the Aftermath of Gross Human Rights 
Violations and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (UN Doc. A/HRC/27/56, 27 Aug. 2014). 
33 Outer limits to the acceptable use of amnesty and similar devices are increasingly enforced in the Inter-
American human rights system.  See, particularly, Par Engstrom and Andrew Hurrell, ‘Why the Human Rights 
Regime in the Americas Matters’, in Mónica Serrano and Vesselin Popovski (eds.), Human Rights Regimes in 
the Americas (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2010).  The region’s existing domestic amnesties have 
almost without exception been challenged or interpretively narrowed in recent years, while the frequency 
of their adoption as initial transitional devices also declines over time.  See Cath Collins, ‘The End of 
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also increasingly conceptualised as necessarily comprehensive – dealing, for instance, with 
consequences for mental as well as physical health; taking account of referred, including 
intergenerational, harm, and allowing for genuine victim participation and respect for victims’ 
dignity.34 How does Chilean TJ practice, particularly around truth initiatives, measure up alongside 
these admittedly exacting standards?  Some necessary factual background on Chile’s truth 
commission sequencing follows, before Valech is explored in more depth. 
 
Truth Commissions in Chile: from Victims to Survivors 
Chile’s first truth commission, the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CNVR or ‘Rettig 
Commission’, 1990-91) acknowledged deaths and disappearances during the 1973-1990 military 
dictatorship,35 but did not individualise cases of survived torture.  A successor body set up to 
complete case classification reported in 1996, and an accumulated total of 3,195 victims was 
thereby acknowledged. These results will be referred to under the generic title ‘Rettig’.  Truth was 
connected both to reparations and to justice in this phase. Reparations, including a modest monthly 
pension, were extended to the immediate family of all those named in the accumulated lists. 36  
Background information on cases submitted to Rettig, whether finally acknowledged or not, was 
                                                          
Impunity?’, in Nicola Palmer, Phil Clark, and Danielle Granville (eds.), Critical Perspectives in Transitional 
Justice (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2012) pp. 399-423; Louise Mallinder ‘The End of Impunity?’ forthcoming, 2016; 
or Cath Collins, Jemima García Godos and Elin Skaar (eds.), Transitional Justice in Latin America: The Uneven 
Road from Impunity towards Accountability (Routledge: forthcoming, 2016).  
34 See Pablo de Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Brazil’s 
Amnesty Commission, spearheading a reparations-led TJ process, has been particularly inventive.  See 
Marcelo Torelly and Paulo Abrão, ‘The Reparations Program as the Lynchpin of Transitional Justice in Brazil’ 
in Reátegui, op. cit., pp 443-85; and ‘Resistance to Change’, in Francesca Lessa and Leigh Payne (eds.) 
Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 152-
81. 
35 Including non-attributed and non-state violence. 
36 Law 19.123, 8 Feb 1992. Other measures instituted around the same time, including access to the public 
health system, were extended to various categories of victim and survivor including Rettig families.   
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sent to the courts.  This brought little immediate justice change, since judicial practice in 1991 and 
1996 was resolutely pro-impunity. It nonetheless represents a significant difference between this 
commission and the subsequent one: Rettig, unlike Valech, left open a connecting door between 
truthtelling and justice. 
Chile’s second official truth commission, officially entitled the National Commission on Political 
Imprisonment and Torture, was announced in mid-2003, as part of a broader ‘human rights policy 
package’ entitled ‘No Hay Mañana sin Ayer’.  The timing is suggestive: the decision came in the 
aftermath of a groundswell of justice demands (see below). The commission, chaired by senior cleric 
Sergio Valech, became the centrepiece of the new policy announcement. Operating between 2004 
and 2005, Valech received testimony and documentation in Chile and abroad from or on behalf of 
people who had survived politically-motivated detention or torture by state agents between 1973 
and 1990.  People eventually came forward in unexpectedly large numbers: the original deadline 
had to be extended, and additional statement-takers hired, as the sobering range and depth of 
atrocities hitherto largely ignored came into focus. Valech’s final published report served as a grim 
catalogue of the depths to which the regime had sunk in efforts to dehumanise and break its 
perceived enemies.  Additional classifications in an appendix gave a 2005 total of almost 29,500 
recognised survivors. 
The public impact of Valech on its initial 2004 release was substantial, perhaps even greater than 
that of Rettig in its day.  At a longer distance from events, and against the backdrop of the gradual 
political and judicial discrediting of Pinochet and some of his more notorious henchmen, details 
emerged of crimes including the setting of dogs on naked female prisoners, the torture of children 
to make their parents talk, or the ‘collateral damage’ of miscarriages induced through sustained 
beating and sexual assault of incapacitated, blindfolded prisoners.  These accounts were hardly 
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susceptible to the ‘exigencies of war’ justifications that some had found at least plausible with 
regard to the deaths of militant young men in the immediate aftermath of the coup.  
‘Valech II’, in 2011, came about largely as a result of battles by human rights organisations on behalf 
of survivors who had not previously testified, or whose cases had not been recognised. A smaller 
group of relatives of hitherto unacknowledged victims of death and disappearance wanted their 
relatives added to the Rettig register.  In the event, after a new, shorter, period of testimony 
gathering and research in 2011, almost 10,000 additional survivors, plus thirty new death and 
disappearance cases, were acknowledged by Valech II.  This iteration did not produce a report, but 
only a statistical account and list of names. Public and media attention was accordingly muted, not 
least because the new iteration was concluded under a right-wing administration clearly 
embarrassed by the whole exercise, which had begun under the previous dispensation. Meanwhile 
survivors, a constituency Valech II had been intended to placate, were in fact incensed by the yet 
again temporary nature of the instance, plus the low rates of endorsement of applications made 
(only around a third of cases proposed were acknowledged by Valech II, down from around 60% for 
Valech I).  
 
Origins of ‘Valech’: Why a second truth commission, and why in 2004? 
Like much of Chile’s patchwork of official transitional justice measures, Valech’s origins lay as much 
in extra-official chivvying and lobbying as in executive decisiveness, moral leadership, or strong 
political will. Pressure to act came from the human rights sector, but also some conservative sectors, 
convinced by the course of events that further action on the ‘human rights question’ could no longer 
be avoided.  The 1998 justice ‘irruption’ – domestic cases against Pinochet plus his October arrest 
in the UK – loomed large for both sectors. A roundtable, carried out in the year 2000 ostensibly to 
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‘resolve’ the issue of the disappeared, had clearly proved insufficient.  Pérotin (op.cit., pp. 3-6) 
attributes Valech “partly” to pressure from human rights organisations and survivors, listing 
additional precipitating and contextual factors. These included the fact that the whole question of 
torture, having become central to extradition wrangling in the UK Pinochet case, remained 
nationally visible: in 2001, Pérotin’s colleague Emilio Meneses, a lecturer at the conservative 
Catholic University of Santiago, was accused by a fellow academic of direct involvement in 1970s 
torture. The issue became a brief cause célèbre.37  By 2002 intense judicial activity begun in 1998 
was about to culminate, with several major cases about to reach a verdict. Anticipation of the 30th 
anniversary of the coup, due in September 2003, stimulated unprecedented amounts of television 
coverage and artistic production. Several emblematic former torture centres were declared national 
monuments. In all says Pérotin, Chile embarked on a “literal and figurative exhumation of its past”, 
(op. cit., p 6, my translation), making some kind of executive gesture or announcement almost 
inevitable. 
The psychiatrist Dr. Paz Rojas, director of the historical human rights organisation CODEPU and a 
longstanding campaigner on behalf of torture survivors, adds a more personal note. She suggests 
that individuals respected by then-president Ricardo Lagos, and close to his and his wife’s inner 
circle, consistently and insistently put to him, around this time, the need to give the newly-visible 
survivors’ movement specific recognition, taking torture and its lingering social effects seriously.38  
Respected jurist, and former Amnesty International president, José Zalaquett frequently advised 
Lagos on human rights questions. Speaking at an August 2003 seminar (proceedings later published 
as Zalaquett, 2003, op. cit.), Zalaquett addressed the recently-released presidential proposals which 
                                                          
37 Patricia Verdugo (ed.), De la Tortura No se Habla (Santiago: Catalonia, 2004). Meneses was suspended 
then reinstated, amidst lawsuits for defamation during which the accuser, himself a torture survivor, was 
vindicated.  
38 Author interview with Dr. Paz Rojas, Santiago, January 2013. 
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contained the germ of the future Valech Commission. Referring to an “enormous” increase in rates 
and effectiveness of judicial investigation Zalaquett suggested that this and other recent events had 
precipitated recognition in military and right wing political circles that deeper remedies were 
needed (Zalaquett, op.cit. p. 45; p. 64).   
Zalaquett also addresses an issue often overlooked in subsequent discussions of Valech: Lagos’s 
original, mid-2003, draft proposed measures to extend concessions and incentives to perpetrators. 
The proposals, which did not prosper, would have offered ‘limited immunity’ for those who gave 
useful information about the disappeared, and early release for those already serving prison time 
who were willing to co-operate. The pill was to be sweetened by extending similar leniency to 
members of rump armed leftist groups, imprisoned for violent crimes committed after transition. 
Zalaquett acknowledged the legitimate apprehensions of some, including relatives’ groups, about 
tying such proposals to suggested truth and reparations advances. These apprehensions were 
certainly shared by survivors, who would not countenance what they saw as further impunity. Their 
opposition appeared to win out, and associations of former political prisoners began to proliferate, 
organised by region, political militancy, or affinity group.  They agreed about little except, 
increasingly, about the need for ‘more’ – more truth, more justice, and reparations to put them at 
least on an equal footing with the victims’ relatives who had for so long been Chile’s main reference 
group for victimhood.  
Truth, Justice and Reparations in the Leadup to Valech 
In the leadup to the first Valech iteration, campaigners had two principal sets of concerns. First, 
what would be the relationship between this new initiative and justice? Rettig had handed results 
to the courts, but at a time when amnesty protected perpetrators and the courts were demonstrably 
not interested in pursuing cases. How would the new commission negotiate or acknowledge a new 
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justice climate much more favourable to accountability? Second, how would it affect existing 
reparations? This concern was driven by the fear of regression. Some torture survivors already had 
health entitlements and modest pensions, through schemes recognising other aspects of 
victimisation.39 Would survivors whose cases were not now acknowledged by Valech lose access to 
these services? 
Answers emerged gradually as the terms of reference of the new initiative became known. 
Regarding the first, the 50-year secrecy law40 actively forbade the redirection of material from the 
new truth commission into the judicial domain. It was, however, acknowledged that documents 
supplied by survivors to the Commission remained inalienably their own, to do with as they saw fit. 
The stated purpose of the secrecy law was, after all, not to dissuade justice activity but to protect 
survivor privacy to maximise the numbers who felt able to come forward. Nonetheless, the exact 
meaning of the ‘personal property’ exception was not spelled out, giving rise to contrasting later 
interpretations. Decisions about function also affected form: the standardised record sheet 
completed on behalf of each person (or which individuals could self-complete) did not designate 
space to record the name of any mentioned perpetrator. The Commission archive is accordingly 
likely to have less specific evidentiary value than is sometimes believed, although files contain 
additional background research by staff. 
                                                          
39 See details and tables in Collins (2014) op. cit.  
40 Initially to be set at thirty years, the term was extended to 50 years in the final text of the law. Then-
president Ricardo Lagos generally offers a personalist, victim-focused explanation for this hike, stating that it 
proceeded from meeting a survivor keen to impress upon him her fervent desire to be sure that her children 
and grandchildren could not see her testimony within her lifetime. Advisers close to his office at the time 
also cite the precedent set by Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who Lagos admired: in 2002, 
Cardoso bowed to Armed Forces pressure and signed off on an upward extension, to 50 years, of secrecy 
periods on official documents. 
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 Regarding the second concern, about the interaction between different kinds of 
entitlement, the law that established ‘Valech reparations’41 did not attempt – as had the previous, 
‘Rettig’, version - to make Valech payments, Rettig pensions, and other reparations that might be 
obtained in future (eg by a civil lawsuit) mutually exclusive. It did, however, make the new pension 
incompatible with pensions previously awarded under the separate ‘exonerados políticos’ 
programme.42 Survivors recognised by both instances would have to opt between entitlements. 
Those recognised by Valech who had previously been admitted, on other grounds, to the ‘PRAIS’ 
health programme – which, importantly, offered specialist mental health support – would continue 
to be entitled, and people recognised by Valech but not previously in PRAIS could now join.  A 
question mark initially remained over those previously admitted to PRAIS on its own, in-house, 
criteria whose cases were not accepted by Valech. Fears that such individuals might be denied 
treatment, or even fall under suspicion of fraud, have to date proved mostly groundless, but did not 
seem at all fantastical at the time.43 Nor were they allayed by any official announcement: if anything 
they were fuelled when, during the runup to Valech II, the Health Ministry ordered PRAIS to produce 
the first ever central register of accredited users.44 
Definitions 
                                                          
41 Law 19.992, 24 Dec. 2004. 
42 For people sacked from their jobs for political reasons during the dictatorship. 
43 Legal proceedings for fraud were in fact instigated against a few dozen unsuccessful Valech applicants, 
and some prior applicants to the exonerados programme. See Observatorio DDHH, ‘Verdad, Justicia y 
Memorialización por Crímenes del Pasado’, Informe Anual sobre DDHH (UDP, Santiago, 2012) and ‘Verdad, 
Justicia y Memoria a 40 años del golpe de Estado’, Informe Anual sobre DDHH (UDP, Santiago, 2013).  The 
2013 report is also available in translation. 
44 At that time the Ministry, like all official bodies including Valech II itself, was operating under a right wing 
administration (sworn in in 2010). Many survivors were instinctively suspicious of intervention by a right 
wing government in this issue area.  PRAIS programmes were however allowed to continue operating 
according to their own, ad hoc, earlier criteria of admission, without further explicit discussion. 
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As we have seen, Rettig had proceeded on the assumption that torture could not be satisfactorily 
individualised. Preserving this contested assumption, while at the same time designing a mechanism 
that would satisfy survivors’ demands, was a difficult circle to square. Zalaquett, op. cit., gives a clue 
to the solution eventually adopted by Valech: cases could be accredited on the basis of political 
imprisonment alone, leaving torture to be secondarily or tacitly acknowledged based solely on 
testimony. Thus the definitional problem surrounding torture was simply displaced onto definitions 
of political imprisonment. In the event, Valech adopted the following definitions: political 
imprisonment was understood as arbitrary detention, carried out for political motives, by state 
agents or persons at their service, between 11 September 1973 (the date of the military coup) and 
10 March 1990 (the date of formal transition) ‘Arbitrary’ detention was understood as detention 
not based on a pre-existing legal norm; detention based on laws which, while technically valid, were 
not in accordance with recognised international human rights principles; detention which was 
prolonged beyond what might be considered reasonable; or detention carried out by, or followed 
by, violation of the rights of the detainee.45 Torture was defined as “ any action by which a person 
has been intentionally subjected to serious physical or mental pain or suffering, with the aim of 
obtaining from that person, or a third party, information or a confession; punishing him or her for 
something that she or he has done or is accused of having done; intimidating or threatening that 
person or others, breaking his or her character or damaging his or her physical or mental integrity, 
or giving expression to any kind of discriminatory treatment. This presupposes that such pain or 
suffering has been inflicted by a state agent or person at the service of the state, or acting at the 
instigation, with the consent, or with the forbearance of such a person”. 46  The report stated that 
                                                          
45 Informe, Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura (2004), pp. 21-22, author’s translation.  
46 Informe, op.cit., p. 19, author’s translation.  
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this working definition had been derived from the prevailing International, and American, 
Conventions against Torture. 
The principal significant exclusions were of people detained en masse after street protests, and 
people whose detention lasted less than 48 hours or was carried out in ‘irregular’ settings, including 
outside Chilean territory. The report however suggests that some such cases were included if the 
Commission was persuaded by evidence of their having been tortured, introducing a grey area as to 
the actual basis on which classifications were made.47  In the event, 94% of those acknowledged in 
2005 as survivors were declared to have been tortured as well as suffering political imprisonment 
(Informe, op. cit., p. 8). 
  
What Valech did and did not do: the careful construction of the ‘dejudicialised’ survivor 
The emergence of survivors as a collective, rights-bearing subject challenged the existing de facto 
‘hierarchy of victims’, which had emerged in Chile over the years as it does in many post-transitional 
and post-conflict settings.  Certain groups come to inhabit, whether deliberately or not, the centre 
of a set of virtual ‘concentric circles’ at whose heart official concern and public attention are more 
prevalent and group demands are more likely to be attended to.  In Chile, the disappeared and their 
relatives occupied the centre ground. Relatives of victims of political execution came next. Survivors 
had generally occupied a more peripheral place.  They were considered and consulted, if at all, 
primarily as potential sources of intelligence about the fate of others: the dead, the disappeared.  
Prior to Valech, their place in the public policy matrix was also largely subsidiary.  They might be 
‘patients’, if they availed themselves of health services through PRAIS.  They might, if they had been 
                                                          
47 Informe, op. cit., p. 9. 
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blacklisted or forcibly exiled, have access to pension credits or similar.48  But the sole, stark fact of 
having been locked up, beaten, and abused in the most unspeakable ways by agents of the state 
had not in itself been deemed worthy of individual acknowledgement or redress.   
There are many reasons for this, not all as simple as official dereliction of duty.  Amongst genuinely 
political active regime opponents, to have survived at all was somehow suspect –it was often 
assumed, rightly or wrongly, that activists who were released had broken or been turned.  Others 
scarcely considered themselves ‘true’ victims at all. These included non-politically active individuals; 
those never detained but ‘only’ beaten and abused during house to house searches; and women, 
children or elderly relatives tortured or held hostage in their own homes to trap unsuspecting family 
members.  A full discussion of the politics of victimhood in Chile lies outside the scope of this paper, 
but the messiness of these overlapping categories of victimhood seems to have escaped those who 
designed the 2003 policy.  Alternatively, it was perhaps felt necessary to subsume the two problems 
into one, thereby preserving the earlier official assertion that torture could not be individually 
accredited.  A definitional line did, after all, have to be drawn somewhere, and borderline cases 
would inevitably be generated. Either way, the eventual outcome was a commission that dealt with 
torture only secondarily to, and through the lens of, political imprisonment.   
Those who had pressed for specific attention to the pernicious and lasting social effects of torture 
protested that the yoking together of the two issues would dilute the specific attention paid to 
torture.  In this they were undoubtedly proved correct. The assertion that torture simply cannot be 
substantiated with the required degree of certainty at the level of the individual, while roundly 
disputed, has nonetheless hampered attempts to obtain justice or compensation through the 
                                                          
48 Under the programmes of reparations for exonerados, and for retornados (returnees), respectively.  
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courts.49  Absent access to testimony and other documentation, the fact that Valech accreditation 
per se only, strictly, speaks to political imprisonment has weakened its utility in court proceedings.  
Although reparations had been promised, it was by no means clear at the time that inclusion in 
Valech would subsequently become the only turnstile for access to the category of recognised 
survivor.  Nor was it anticipated, at least not publicly, that entitlements previously extended to 
survivors might be withdrawn in future if they refused or neglected to take part.  People therefore 
chose to testify, or not, based on factors other than their views about or need for reparations. What 
was, however, known was that the 50-year embargo would prevent anyone, including judges, 
having access to supporting testimony or other source material.50  
This single fact about Valech is the gulf that qualitatively divides Valech from Rettig.  It also 
constituted both a disincentive and an incentive to giving testimony.  More militant ex-prisoner 
groups felt they were being silenced or bought off.  They boycotted the instance, launching their 
own parallel efforts to publicly denounce torturers.  In other cases, of course, the safety net of 
confidentiality was the only thing that persuaded some people to talk about what they had lived 
through.  One of the many practical and ethical dilemmas raised by subsequent campaigns to change 
the secrecy law is precisely the difficulty of differentiating after the fact between those who were, 
and were not, prepared for their testimony to be handed to a judge or made public.51  Other 
                                                          
49 After the year 2000, survivors bringing legal claims began to be routinely referred for forensic medical 
examination by judges at a loss as to how to investigate allegations of historic torture.  The search for 
physical manifestations, or at the very least clear-cut signs of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), became 
a spurious method for differentiating between group claimants. The absence of a definitive diagnosis of 
PTSD was erroneously treated by some judges as a direct refutation of the veracity of survivors’ accounts.   
Interview with Dr. Paz Rojas, op. cit., and remarks by claimants and forensic service personnel at a closed 
seminar convened by the Observatory in 2013. 
50 The 2011 iteration, moreover, was not authorised to produce a ‘report’ but solely a statistical account and 
list of names. 
51 A point cogently made by Claudio Herrera, who served as the Commission’s executive secretary, 
commenting in a personal capacity.  See Observatorio DDHH, ‘Taller Comisión Valech II’, op. cit.  
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commissions have resolved the access to testimony dilemma in different ways. Peru’s truth 
commission, for instance, allows limited researcher access to files.  Valech was, however, 
particularly extreme in the blanket nature and length of its intended access embargo.  As a truth 
measure, Valech was thereby regressive with respect to Rettig in at least two significant ways: the 
complete, publicly accessible nature of the truth produced was lesser in Valech, and connections 
with one of the other major dimensions of transitional justice – justice itself – were markedly absent 
in design (and have been only very partially diluted in practice).  This attempted severing of justice 
connections took place, moreover, at a time when the possibility of real judicial action was 
significantly higher than it had been in 1991.  There are many possible interpretations of this growing 
separation between official truth and official justice. Some senior judicial figures advance a partly 
pragmatic explanation.  There were, they say, genuine fears in their own ranks that the specially-
designated magistrate system, already working at capacity over death and disappearance cases, 
simply could not cope with an influx of thousands of new investigations.  A more political 
explanation, which tends to find favour in civil society human rights organisations, is that post-1998 
justice reactivation led to executive efforts to pre-empt new justice claims or divert them into truth-
and-reparations instances. In this interpretation, successive executives, whether of the centre-left 
(1990-2010 and 2014-present) or centre-right (2010-2014) have attempted to soft-pedal the 
criminal justice aspect of transitional justice due to tensions, or the fear of tensions, with military, 
former military, and other conservative circles.52  
Challenges to Valech secrecy 
                                                          
52 Behind the scenes anti-accountability pressures from the political right and present-day Armed Forces are 
routinely denied, but just as routinely evident, in day to day monitoring of TJ related events.  See 
Observatorio de Justicia Transicional electronic news bulletins 1-32, since 2009. Numerous author interviews 
with judicial and police sources over the same period, on file with the author, support the point. 
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Over the course of 2012 and 2013, the judicial branch became both object and origin of challenges 
to the secrecy regime surrounding Valech. First, in 2012, individuals whose cases had not been 
acknowledged in the second iteration requested court orders to enable them to challenge the 
specific grounds on which they had been turned down. The arguments included those of equality: 
the 2004/5 instance, Valech I, had a personal notification and appeals system which the 2011 
iteration lacked. Although most of these initial applications failed, the INDH decided in late 2012 to 
seek a definitive ruling from the Comptroller General’s Office, Contraloría, as to the terms of its 
inherited role as keeper of the files. The result broadly upheld a strong interpretation of the duty of 
secrecy.53 Chile’s second Universal Periodic Review before the United Nations (UN) Human Rights 
Council, on 28 January 2014, produced a recommendation that Valech confidentiality be repealed.54 
The issue was also referred to in the 2013 campaign manifesto of Michelle Bachelet - who began a 
second (non-consecutive) term as the country’s president in March 2014 – albeit in the vaguest 
possible terms.55 On 10 June 2014, the Contraloria issued a new ruling, in response to a fresh request 
by the INDH. 56  Although the ruling itself was extremely non-committal, the INDH chose to interpret 
it as authorisation to hand information to the courts, on judges’ specific request, for cases seen by 
Valech II – the 2011 iteration - only.  This remains the situation at December 2015. 
                                                          
53 Dictamen no. 60303, Contraloría General de la República, 1 Oct. 2012. 
54 Report to the UN Human Rights Council of the UN Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review - Chile, 
(UN Doc. A/HRC/26/5, 2 April 2014), para. 121.116. 
55 Criticism in 2013 of the lack of reference to human rights policy in any major presidential candidate’s 
platform prompted the Bachelet campaign to release a ‘civil society consult’ document which mentioned 
‘looking into’ the 50 year confidentiality of ‘judicial records’. The formulation contained no firm promise of 
action nor even any dependable reference to Valech, since its documents are certainly no classifiable as 
‘judicial records’.  See Observatorio DDHH ‘Truth, Justice and Memory’, 2013, op. cit. 
56 INDH Ord. 506, 19 Nov. 2013, and, in reply, Contraloría General de la República, Dictamen 41.230, 10 June 
2014. 
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The discrepancy between Valech I and Valech II, indefensible on any common sense grounds, arises 
due to legal technicalities.57  The result is an unsatisfactory and probably unstable equilibrium, in 
which all involved privately acknowledge as impossible to defend from first principles.  The matter 
moreover illustrates genuine tensions between the right to truth, access to information, and the 
right to privacy. Information, in the form of raw data, is not a synonym for verified truth, particularly 
if that data was produced by repressive agencies. Paraguay’s Terror Archive, and the former Stasi 
archive, have faced similar dilemmas regarding records purporting to name informants: in the words 
of Timothy Garton Ash, “[c]arelessly used, the records of a state that worked by organized lying […] 
can ruin lives”.58  The same issue affects private files, amassed by a secretive, far-right organisation, 
which were recently released by judicial fiat in Chile. Valech files likewise contain some official, 
unverified, documentation from or about dictatorship-era security agencies. Most concern, 
however, revolves around personal survivor narratives offered under confidentiality rules that are 
now being challenged.  Where the right to truth is considered to be collective, rather than inhering 
in any individual victim, as the Inter-American Court has sometimes suggested, the question of 
ownership of such narratives becomes thorny.  Solutions such as anonymisation of testimony might 
open the repository to research scrutiny but would not resolve the justice question, while a person-
by-person retrospective authorisation of release would founder, if nothing else, in respect of 
survivors who are now deceased.  
‘Post-Valech’ Developments 
                                                          
57 The statute for Valech I was passed by a qualified majority, whereas Valech II was constituted by a decree 
law. This distinction was sufficient to allow Contraloría and the INDH to determine that access to 
information laws allowed an exception to privacy in regard to the latter but not the former. 
58 Timothy Garton Ash, cited in Paige Arthur, ‘How Transitions Shaped Human Rights’, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 31 (2009) p. 332. 
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Privacy and information tussles are not the only ongoing reverberations of the ‘Valech story’.  Like 
Rettig before it, the instance has proved to be located nearer to the beginning than to the end of a 
narrative which involves demand inflation, bargaining, and mutual accusations of bad faith. The 
mere presence of controversy or critique is not sufficient in itself to suggest that the instance was 
flawed: we are dealing, after all, with a large and diverse group of people subjected to fundamentally 
irreversible harms, making it difficult if not impossible to imagine a perfectly adequate, and perfectly 
crafted, state response.  Nonetheless, aspects of later difficulties, and the handling of them, could 
arguably have been foreseen and more adeptly handled.  Thus, throughout 2013 and 2014, a range 
of associations of former political prisoners made representations to the authorities. Their demands 
were basically twofold: the re-opening of victim and survivor lists on a permanent basis, to allow 
any case with new information to be (re)considered at any time; and the improvement of the 
economic reparations associated with Valech recognition.59 No response was forthcoming, and in 
April 2015 groups resorted to the dictatorship-era tactic of a hunger strike. In some senses, the fate 
of this apparently dramatic gesture confirmed the former prisoners’ sense of marginalisation: 
relatively little press or official attention was paid as over 100 former detainees and torture victims, 
some in their 70s, starved themselves in a five week protest. In May 2015, however, a bilateral 
commission ended the protest by effectively postponing the matter. The government offered a one-
off financial ‘bonus’ plus the promise that a new Human Rights Subsecretariat, to be created at some 
as yet undefined future point, would revisit the whole issue of survivors’ justice and reparations 
entitlements.60 
                                                          
59 The pensions accruing to one and to the other situation were and are widely different, consisting of 
approximately USD 666 per month for Rettig families, and USD 217 for individuals named by Valech. The 
discrepancy is partly explained by the fact that the larger, Rettig, amount was designed to compensate an 
entire family for the loss of a breadwinner, while the Valech pension is personal.    
60 The bonus, of around USD 1,500, was effected in late October 2015. The Subsecretariat was created on 
paper in mid-December, meaning it will not become operational until well into 2016. 
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These offers were so far from the immediate, permanent, measures originally demanded that it is 
difficult to imagine them leading to any permanent solution. For analytical purposes, however, it is 
of more interest to note that the decision to defer all unresolved matters to a new, generic human 
rights instance bypassed an obvious existing alternative, thereby constituting a deliberate option 
against a dedicated TJ agency of the kind discussed earlier in this paper. Thus the existing alternative 
consisted of the state Human Rights Programme, a somewhat misleadingly named office which has 
de facto become an embryonic transitional justice agency regarding the dead and disappeared. 
Having provided social assistance, legal advice, and memorialisation support to relatives since 1996, 
the Programme began to act independently in criminal cases after 2009.  Increasingly loved by 
relatives and disapproved of by more cautious official elements, the Programme’s involvement was 
made a precondition for negotiation by the 2015 hunger strikers.  Its enthusiastic and highly capable 
young director threw himself into the role, meeting assiduously with survivors’ groups and 
government departments. A detailed, costed proposal emerged which would have turned the 
Programme into a full TJ agency, mandated to deal with survivors as well as victims, and explicitly 
empowered to administer truth commission lists and reparations, alongside its existing justice and 
memorialisation work regarding deaths and disappearances.61 The proposal never received an 
official reply, and was clearly discounted in favour of a continuation of the previous piecemeal 
approach.62 
Conclusions 
                                                          
61 Written reports and proposals by the Programa de Derechos Humanos del Ministerio del Interior, on file 
with the author, and interviews with Programa personnel in 2014 and 2015, individual identities reserved at 
interviewees’ request.  
62 Thus social work services, memorial funds and legal advice to relatives (only) remain with the Programme; 
victim lists stay definitively closed to new applications, and reparations are paid automatically by the state 
benefits agency. No state office currently has oversight responsibility or powers over either victim lists or 
the content of reparations, and survivors have no entitlement to legal or social work support equivalent to 
that given to relatives. 
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Public policy efforts in Chile to deal belatedly63 with survivors’ rights have to date fallen short in both 
design and execution of the holistic TJ aspirations discussed earlier in this paper. This is particularly 
true as regards the benchmark of ‘reliable, complete, and widely known’ truth, constituting a step 
towards justice. The Valech report of 2004 certainly had public impact, and Commissioners strove 
to make results both reliable and complete, within the limits of their permitted frame of reference. 
Those limits were nonetheless significant, particularly regarding definition and accreditation of 
torture. The completeness of Valech was further limited by the deliberate omission of perpetrator 
names or clear assignation of institutional responsibility. Levels of public dissemination of Valech’s 
outcomes and implications moreover diminished between iterations and over time. The second 
iteration had no print version, and failed to notify applicants directly,64 while the Commission itself 
was completely dissolved immediately the list was delivered to the president.  Today, it is no easy 
feat even to trace a complete set of the published reports in a single official repository.65  
The decoupling of Valech from justice entitlements was explicit and evident, with the attempted 
legislative prohibition of judicial ‘recycling’ of information provided to it still largely effective. More 
generally, justice clearly remains the most restricted dimension of the transitional justice rights 
matrix regarding torture. The great majority of accountability cases are still brought at private 
initiative, with most focusing on the dead and disappeared.66 When the state, or parts of it, began 
timidly to move beyond the toleration of private claims to the development of an active prosecution 
                                                          
63 ‘Belated’ in regard to the ‘timely’ justice horizons required by the American Convention on Human Rights; 
and also when compared to much earlier official action over deaths and disappearances. 
64 Notification was via a now-defunct website. The socioeconomic, geographical, and age profile of 
applicants made this perhaps the single least appropriate method that could have been chosen, even 
considering Chile’s relatively high levels of urbanisation and connectivity. 
65 Online legislative archives contain copies of some relevant legislation. The INDH offers web access to the 
2011 list, and advice on entitlements. No governmental site however hosts the 2004-05 and 2011 reports 
and lists in their entirety.  
66 Around 80 per cent, at a conservative estimate based on Observatorio records at mid-2015. 
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strategy,67 absent victims were similarly prioritised. The relegation of survived violations to a lower 
tier became if anything more explicit.68 A notable increase, since 2010, in survivor-instigated cases 
for torture has helped to dilute, though not yet to reverse, this trend.69 
Moving beyond Valech to consider Chile’s general approach to TJ, reparations policy is often, and 
rightly, believed to be one of the more successful dimensions of state transitional justice practice in 
Chile. As we have seen, ‘Rettig measures’ were updated then extended to Valech survivors, albeit 
with some limitations.70 Additional and alternative measures had always existed for other categories 
of victim or survivor. Intergenerational reach, one of the aspirational goals mentioned above, is 
partially present in various measures, and was introduced to others in 2004.71  The integral nature 
of these and other measures is however more questionable. A reparations study carried out by the 
Observatorio in 2012 modelled the effects of the different packages on a range of victims/ survivors 
over time. Measures showed no sign of having been designed to accompany the individual life cycle, 
nor high levels of synergy one with another.   
In the symbolic arena, reparations programmes are almost universally described as ‘benefits’ rather 
than entitlements, and are periodically subject to accusations of undue generosity or outright fraud. 
Their continuity was, as we have seen, thrown into question for survivors during and after Valech.  
No state entity is currently charged with overseeing reparations or promoting a language of 
                                                          
67 Through, respectively, ex officio investigative orders made by a judicial prosecutor in 2011 and criminal 
complaints (querellas) made by the Human Rights Programme in its own right after 2009. 
68 A Supreme Court pronouncement in 2010 supported the contention of one specially-designated ‘human 
rights case’ magistrate that torture or sexual assault should be investigated as ordinary crimes.  Vigorously 
contested, the disposition has been partly reversed. See Observatorio DDHH, 2012, op. cit. 
69 See TJ-themed chapters of annual human rights reports for 2014 and 2015 by the UDP, op. cit., and the 
National Human Rights Institute, INDH ( www.indh.cl) 
70 Notably, and quite anachronistically, Valech pensions and bonuses are inheritable only by widows (not by 
widowers) upon decease of the recipient. 
71 When educational scholarships offered as part of Valech entitlements were made transferable to children 
and grandchildren.  
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recognition and apology:  Correa points out that such neglect diminishes the potential of reparations 
to restore civic trust.72 A series of temporally limited truth commissions, none foreseen at the time 
its predecessor(s) were implemented, have now become the sole entry portals for Chile’s major 
reparations packages. Operational disputes or ambiguities over application deadlines, tax liability, 
and discontinuation of pensions in cases of suspected fraud, are resolved by non-specialist 
administrative bodies on an ad hoc basis. 
This by-default delegation of operational TJ responsibilities to existing instances not mandated or 
equipped to carry them out is undoubtedly problematic. So too, however, is the periodic invention 
of temporary, time-limited instances to deal on a specialised but single-issue basis with truth, or 
justice, or reparations. Post-hoc adjustments usually ensue, and difficulties often result. Thus the 
lack of definition of Valech-related reparations until after the event led to unnecessary concern 
about health entitlements. The shoehorning of ‘Rettig cases’ – cases of death and disappearance – 
into Valech II trapped the approved cases in the legal framework designed for Valech, meaning files 
could not be passed to the courts and no agency could work out how to activate reparations to 
relatives.  
Today, the lack of an agency allowed to consider new cases on an ongoing basis means that rights 
entitlements are potentially being allowed to lapse although the situation of having been victimised, 
and its effects, does not.  Survivors recognised by Valech meanwhile have no access to official legal 
representation or advice if they wish to pursue justice claims, nor are cases pursued ex officio for 
torture.73 Since there is no administrative route for extending or rescinding victim or survivor status 
                                                          
72 Correa, op.cit. 
73 Limited exceptions have begun to emerge only through the actions of a small number of individual judges, 
who have begun to open separate investigations if witnesses called in disappearance cases testify that they 
themselves were tortured. This route is one source of the occasional judicial requests for Valech II case files 
that are currently being honoured. 
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in response to case verdicts, judicial branch deliberations which alter the TJ record are simply not 
assimilated by the state’s executive and legislative arms. 
This exploration of recent Chilean practice in regard to transitional justice policy accordingly shows 
little sign of increasing synergy between measures over time, although a larger judicial caseload now 
exists and a greater quantity of individual truth or reparations measures has been accumulated to 
the overall ‘pile’. This state of affairs suggests both that more should not automatically be mistaken 
for better, and that policy integration cannot be assumed and, if desired, must instead be 
consciously designed.  The desire in at least some circles to explicitly integrate transitional justice 
policies is visible in Chile, as in at least two of the other regional examples referred to earlier in this 
paper (namely Colombia and Brazil).  For Chile, as we have seen, the Human Rights Programme, 
originally a truth instance with a very limited mandate, has since 2014 repeatedly yet unsuccessfully 
lobbied to become a more holistic transitional justice agency.74  
Our discussion of the Chilean case nonetheless also suggests that the desirability of such integration 
of truth, justice and reparation functions and/or instances needs further interrogation, and it is to 
this question that we now turn. The already enunciated theoretical concerns underpinning this 
paper include the normative notion of a bundle of inter-related rights which some clearly feel should 
become the yardstick for state-level design and implementation of TJ measures.  In this regard, we 
may question whether any such bundling of rights is, or could ever be, an unqualified good.  The 
loading of simultaneous truth, justice and reparations responsibilities and expectations onto any 
particular point of a post-authoritarian or post-conflict process may prove not only impractical but 
sometimes undesirable. It may, for example, place unrealistic logistical or administrative burdens 
                                                          
74 Sources: written reports and proposals by the Programa de Derechos Humanos del Ministerio del Interior, 
on file with the author, and interviews with Programa personnel in 2014 and 2015, identities reserved at 
interviewees’ request.  See also Observatorio DDHH (2014).  
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on fragile or resource-poor states even before attention to conflict-related damage is considered.  
Thus the logistical challenge of constructing a single unified victim register in Peru proved so 
substantive that plans to postpone all reparations payments until its completion had to be 
abandoned. Even in Argentina, where the justice dimension of TJ has recently been vigorously 
pursued, truth and reparations advances have not kept pace.  
The simultaneous front-loading of truth, justice and reparations expectations onto the already 
considerable challenges faced by the ongoing Colombian peace process have meanwhile produced, 
inter alia, visible pressure on the Inter-American Court to soften the strong pro-prosecution 
presumption visible in its pre-2012 jurisprudence.75  Veto player resistance to TJ may be particularly 
predictable or visible in regard to justice, but the recent experiences of Peru, El Salvador and others 
show that truth and reparations measures can equally produce controversy and resistance that at 
times risks derailing the entire TJ endeavour.76  In negatively affecting the credibility of human rights 
discourse in general, such setbacks can also arguably have deleterious effects on guarantees of non-
repetition. A partial solution perhaps lies in adopting a phased, rather than maximalist, benchmark 
for measuring states’ fulfilment over time of their transitional justice responsibilities. This moves us 
towards notions of progressive realisation presently more often discussed or admitted in regard to 
economic, social and cultural rights. Thus while TJ policy may be encouraged or required to address, 
over time, each of the elements of truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-repetition, not 
every measure need be expected to contribute equally, or even at all, in every element.  Enshrining 
in the norm framework itself the permissibility of phasing and sequencing, allowing states to begin 
with the measure that generates least internal resistance, might both better map existing practice 
                                                          
75 See Inter-American Court on Human Rights, El Mozote v. El Salvador (2012). 
76 See controversies in Peru over the Ojo que Llora monument, and the subsequent threat by Peru to 
withdraw from the Inter-American system (Katherine Hite. Politics and the Art of Commemoration (NY: 
Routledge, 2012)). For El Salvador, civil society completion of a truth commission-mandated victim memorial 
provoked a right wing municipality to erect a statue to death squad founder Roberto d’Aubuisson.  
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and encourage reluctant states to start along a TJ road even if they feel unequal to the task of 
simultaneously meeting a single, ever-growing, agenda of all-or-nothing demands.  The notion that 
even within dimensions, challenges may be more successfully met over time clearly chimes with 
Lagos’s reference to “incremental degrees of truth” (crecientes grados de verdad) in his 2003 No 
Hay Mañana speech.77 While the perils of admitting incrementalism include those of relativising the 
status of early truthtelling as necessarily incomplete or provisional, the dangers of all-or-nothing 
maximalism include those of blocking off, as Chile did for so long, the possibility or need for 
admitting subsequent revision or revelation to the official record. 
These issues point to a question raised throughout the paper about the actual effects of synergy, 
contradiction, or insulation between measures. This paper has taken a largely critical view of 
attempts to mutually isolate truth and justice, and limit reparations implications, in the design of 
recent truth measures in Chile. This critique nevertheless proceeds from very specific circumstances: 
a long-running TJ process, in a country with robust economic capacity demonstrably not threatened 
by imminent authoritarian regression, with strong rule of law indicators and explicit acceptance of 
prevailing human rights norms. These norms, as we have seen increasingly prescribe, presuppose 
or recommend interconnected measures.  Chile’s reluctance to adopt rights-based language 
surrounding TJ, and in particular the recent attempt to row back from truth-justice linkages achieved 
in the previous truth commission, are accordingly particularly difficult to justify. Indeed, although 
there may well be other scenarios in which the classic truth-or-justice tension still persists,78 a 
regional look at South America, at least, suggests reasonably robust levels of state repudiation of 
past terror practices combined with strong cross-border civil society mobilisation – facilitated by 
common languages, pre-transitional solidarity and exile links.   
                                                          
77 As cited in Pérotin, op.cit., p 2. 
78 See Alison Bissett, Truth Commissions and Criminal Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
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Attempts to seal off judicial consequences to truth, or to corral truth revelations within one set of 
national borders, appear to be swimming against the tide. State-to-state collaborative agreements 
were signed in 2013 and 2014 between Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, enshrining commitments to 
pool and share information about cross-border repression gleaned from dictatorship-era files and 
truth commission endeavours. The Instituto de Políticas Públicas en Derechos Humanos, IPPDH, a 
permanent human rights coordination set up by Mercosur countries in 2009, hosts an online archive 
of documents related to the Cóndor repressive network. Most affected Latin American states, 
including Chile, have moreover recently introduced access to information or freedom of information 
laws in recent years. As we have seen above, these can and have been utilised to create or 
strengthen a presumption of transparency with regard to dictatorship-era archives and/or newly 
created repositories of testimony. Such tendencies, while not an unqualified good, are a concrete 
fact, rendering it ever more unlikely that newer TJ endeavours can be controlled by states as tightly 
as were those carried out early in transition.  
Linkages between truth and justice, and in turn, to reparations, nonetheless raise particular 
dilemmas with regard to overlap and contradiction. As regards overlap, some states have attempted 
to pre-empt civil claim-making by victims of state harm by retrospectively declaring this to be 
incompatible with receipt of economic reparations – pensions etc – from administrative 
programmes.  Other states, including Chile, have come to allow both routes, while some clearly 
hope to discourage either.  Since existing norm frameworks are largely silent on which mode of 
delivery of the right to reparations is to be ‘preferred’, all of these alternatives except for the last 
are arguably legitimate. However, the increasing emphasis on victim-centredness which surrounds 
reparations discussions is potentially both contradictory and disruptive of synergy, whichever 
mode(s) of reparation are in operation. The internally contradictory aspect arises because victim-
centredness, usually recommended from a desire to augment overall takeup, makes a case for 
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needs-based, tailor-made, and/or participatory models of reparation. Transparency, fiscal 
responsibility, and adequate entry filters to minimise fraud or error in reparation nonetheless limit 
the extent to which programmes can proceed via a victim-centred presumption of veracity regarding 
individual testimony. Indeed, Zalaquett implicitly criticises the “flexible” criteria applied to pre-
Valech reparations programmes, based, he says, on giving “the benefit of the doubt” (Zalaquett, op. 
cit. p. 61, my translation).79  
Tying reparations access instead to truth commission outcomes or the results of judicial processes 
is rarely, however, a satisfactory solution to this difficulty. In a trial setting, harm that is to be 
adduced as evidence against a defendant will be subject to stringent evidentiary standards that far 
exceed those which are appropriate as a threshold for reparations. Thus a person may be unable to 
prove in court that particular, named individuals can or should be held criminally or civilly liable for 
harm caused to him or her, even while it is quite evident that the harm was indeed caused, and that 
the state was responsible. Truth commission may develop, as the Salvadoran one did, sui generis 
taxonomies for classifying incidents as accepted fact, likely, or unproven; but such scales are 
unsuited to judicial or reparatory purposes.  Valech suffered similar limitations: the decision not to 
classify a case was often interpreted by survivors as a slight on their honesty rather than a sign of a 
deficient mandate.80 
Yoking together official truth acknowledgement with reparations entitlements meanwhile in effect 
adds economic connotations to inclusion on victim lists, which inescapably alters the nature and 
purpose of truthseeking.  It is also particularly likely, in symmetrical or quasi-symmetrical conflicts, 
                                                          
79 See, for a general discussion, C. Waterhouse, ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Moral Agency and the 
Role of Victims in Reparations Programs’. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 31:1 
(2009), pp. 257-94. 
80 See Observatorio DDHH report on Valech methods, op. cit. Based also on the author’s experience of 
offering workshops on Valech II outcomes, to Santiago-based survivors’ groups and to a national association 
of former child detainees, in 2012. 
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to add a new edge to debates about state versus nonstate, individual versus collective, attribution 
of responsibilities.  There is scarce evidence to date that these complexities have been coherently 
addressed by individual state initiatives, as we have seen. Nor are they commonly dealt with in the 
core texts of regional and international norm sets, as is perhaps to be expected.  Nonetheless, since 
both domestic practice and Inter-American system resolutions and verdicts increasingly straddle 
multiple dimensions of TJ, the underlying suppositions about synergy that underpin such 
approaches may repay closer study. 
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